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Earnings nonresponse in household surveys is widespread, yet there is
limited knowledge of how nonresponse biases earnings measures. We
examine the consequences of nonresponse on earnings gaps and in-
equality using Current Population Survey individual records linked
to administrative earnings data. The common assumption that earn-
ings are missing at random is rejected. Nonresponse across the earn-
ings distribution is U-shaped, highest in the left and right tails. Inequal-
ity measures differ between household and administrative data due in
part to nonresponse. Nonresponse biases earnings differentials by
race, gender, and education, particularly in the tails. Flexible copula-
based models can account for nonrandom nonresponse.
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I. Introduction
Thirty-plus years ago, Lillard, Smith, andWelch (1986) brought to the fore-
front the issue of earnings nonresponse in the Current Population Survey
(CPS), providing a sharp critique of Census Bureau (hereafter, Census)
imputation procedures. Since that time much has changed, some for
the better and some not. Census responded to the critique of Lillard
et al. and substantially improved the quality of its imputation procedures.
For the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC; known histori-
cally as the March supplement), Census uses a sequential hot-deck proce-
dure to address item nonresponse for missing earnings data by assigning
individuals with missing earnings values that come from individuals (“do-
nors”) with similar characteristics.1 Less well known is that in addition to
item nonresponse, there exists ASEC supplement nonresponse. This oc-
curs when households participating and responding in the monthly CPS
refuse to participate in theASEC supplement. Census also uses a hot-deck
procedure for whole-supplement nonresponse. Offsetting the progress
in data processing, however, were sharply rising rates of earnings nonre-
sponse. As depicted in figure 1, there was a substantial increase in the
1990s and then again after 2011, such that by 2015 total (item and whole)
nonresponse in the ASEC reached 43 percent.2 The item nonresponse
rate of 25 percent is more than double that at the time of the critique
of Lillard et al. Additionally, the CPS monthly outgoing rotation group
files have earnings-item nonresponse rates currently above 35 percent,
while the much larger American Community Survey (ACS) has earnings
nonresponse rates of about 20 percent, suggesting that nonresponse is
pervasive across the most important federal household surveys.
Unfortunately, we know surprisingly little about patterns of earnings
nonresponse, or its potential consequences for important labor-market is-
sues such as earnings gaps by gender and race, or inequality. Lillard et al.
1 Welniak (1990) documents changes over time in Census hot-deck methods for the CPS
ASEC.
2 For a careful analysis, see Bee, Gathright, and Meyer (2015). An additional form of
nonresponse is so-called unit nonresponse, which occurs when there is a noninterview
or refusal to participate even in the monthly CPS survey. These rates for the basic CPS were
between 8 and 9 percent during our sample period (Dixon 2012). Also, as a point of com-
parison, nonresponse rates for typical labor supply variables (weeks worked or hours per
week) were in the 3 to 5 percent range over the past two decades.
ety of Labor Economists, Joint Statistical Meetings, American Economic Association Meet-
ings, Brigham Young University, Emory University, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Fed-
eral Reserve Board, Institute for Fiscal Studies, University of Essex, University of New South
Wales, and University of Sydney. The analysis provided in this paper has been conducted at
the United States Census Bureau, the Atlanta Research Data Center, and the Kentucky Re-
search Data Center. All results shown in the paper have received clearance from the Census
Bureau. The opinions and conclusions are solely those of the authors. Programs are pro-
vided as supplementary material online at the journal’s website.
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(1986, 492) suggested that ASEC nonresponse is likely to be highest in
the tails of the distribution, but provided limited evidence since they could
not observe earnings for nonrespondents. Lillard et al. (1986, 493, table 2)
place white men in eight earnings intervals based on a combination of re-
ported and predicted earnings. They find a U-shaped nonresponse pat-
tern with respect to earnings, with the highest rates in the top three earn-
ings categories.
Whether and to what extent earnings nonresponse is of economic con-
sequence depends on the questions being addressed and the reasons for
nonresponse. Prior research has shown that use of imputed earnings can
seriously bias average wage gap estimates studied widely by social science
researchers (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004; Bollinger and Hirsch 2006;
Heckman and LaFontaine 2006), even if the earnings data are missing
completely at random.3 If earnings are missing completely at random,
FIG. 1.—Trends in item and total earnings imputations in the ASEC. This figure displays
trends in item earnings and total (item1 whole supplement) imputations in the ASEC among
workers. The imputation rate is weighted using the ASEC supplement weight. Sources: Authors’
calculations and the US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 1988–2016 Annual Social
and Economic Supplement.
3 Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) labeled this “match bias,” which occurs most notably
in earnings equations in which the dependent variable includes nonrespondents whose
earnings are assigned (imputed) based on a set of match attributes. If one includes attri-
butes on the right-hand side that are not matched in the earnings imputation process, co-
efficients on these attributes are attenuated. Hirsch and Schumacher used union status as
an example; nonrespondent union members are mostly assigned nonunion earnings, while
nonunion workers are sometimes assigned the earnings of a union member. Heckman and
LaFontaine (2006) focus on bias to GED estimated returns; nonrespondent GED holders
are rarely assigned the earnings of a GED donor. Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) expand the
analysis to forms of imperfect matching (e.g., education or age) and derive precise measures
of match bias.
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then nonresponse is not dependent on earnings, even absent covariates;
if earnings are missing at random (MAR), then nonresponse is not de-
pendent on earnings after conditioning on covariates; and if earnings
are not missing at random (NMAR), then nonresponse is dependent on
the value of missing earnings even after conditioning on covariates (Rubin
1976; Little and Rubin 2002). It is this latter case that is referred to as hav-
ing nonresponse bias or nonignorable nonresponse. Both Census impu-
tation procedures and common inverse-probability weighting methods to
deal with nonresponse assume that nonresponse is ignorable; that is, those
not reporting earnings have earnings similar to respondents with equiv-
alent measured attributes. If the MAR assumption is violated, measures of
earnings gaps and distributions will be biased.
Given the high earnings nonresponse rates in Census household sur-
veys, coupled with a paucity of evidence on nonresponse patterns and
its consequences, we address three important and closely related ques-
tions. We do so using restricted-access ASEC household files linked to ad-
ministrative tax data from the Social Security Administration Detailed
Earnings Record (DER) for March 2006–11 (corresponding to calendar
years 2005–10). First, how does earnings nonresponse vary across the
earnings distribution? Access to the DER is uniquely advantageous to ad-
dress this question as it affords the opportunity to fill in missing earnings
for nonrespondents, and to compare survey responses to administrative
tax records for respondents. We align each worker’s ASEC earnings re-
sponse status against the worker’s corresponding earnings level from
the DER. We examine this relationship for men and women separately,
as well as for full-time, full-year workers and those whose ASEC reports
are provided by a proxy (i.e., another household member). Nearly half
of ASEC earnings reports are from proxies. The extent to which proxy re-
porting affects nonresponse patterns and earnings accuracy is not well
understood.
The second question we address is whether nonresponse is ignor-
able. That is, do respondents and nonrespondents have equivalent con-
ditional earnings distributions, and if so, can the earnings of survey re-
spondents accurately describe the missing counterfactual distribution of
a combined respondent and nonrespondent sample as if the nonrespon-
dents had responded? This question directly addresses the efficacy of the
MARassumptionused inCensus imputation procedures and,more broadly,
in many related missing-data procedures. MAR relies on the assumption
that the joint distribution of earnings and response status, conditional on
covariates, can be expressed as the product of the conditionalmarginal dis-
tribution of response status and the conditional marginal distribution of
earnings. This leads to our two complementary tests of MAR made pos-
sible with access to administrative data, one that examines whether the
decision to respond to the ASEC earnings question is independent of
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earnings, and a second that examines whether the distribution of earn-
ings is independent of response status. Furthermore, we also estimate pa-
rametric and nonparametric earnings regressions using the DER, and then
test differences in the residuals from those regressions based on response
status. This provides estimates of summary statistics for the conditional dis-
tribution of earnings for both respondents and nonrespondents. Absent
the link to the DER these tests are not possible because of missing earn-
ings of ASEC nonrespondents.
The third question is whether earnings nonresponse affects standard
estimates of earnings gaps (by gender, race, and ethnicity), returns to
schooling, and earnings inequality and volatility. To address this ques-
tion, we estimate saturated quantile earnings models to test how nonre-
sponse affects outcomes in the tails of the distribution, alongside models
of central tendency. In addition, we also present estimates of how nonre-
sponse impacts standard measures of inequality such as the Gini and 90-
10 (and 90-50 and 50-10) ratios and top income shares. For the volatility
analysis, we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the ASEC whereby it is
possible tomatch up to half of the sample from one year to the next to ex-
amine both the dynamics of nonresponse and implications for summary
measures of volatility. Answers to the inequality and volatility questions
have taken on increasing importance in recent years with the expansion
of distributional research, whether using standard summary measures of
unconditional or conditional inequality (e.g., Piketty and Saez 2003;
Lemieux 2006; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Burkhauser et al. 2012)
or fully specified quantile regression models of earnings (Buchinsky
1994; Kline and Santos 2013; Arellano and Bonhomme 2017). Under
MAR, unconditioned measures of inequality may differ between the full
sample with imputations and a sample omitting imputed earners. The
full sample is likely to provide a consistent estimate of unconditional in-
equality if the covariates used in the imputation procedure provide an
unbiasedmeasure of earnings andmaintain variance. Using only respon-
dents provides more accurate earnings responses, but risks bias (absent
reweighting) to the extent that nonresponse rates differ across the earn-
ings distribution, as we subsequently show. The full sample with imputa-
tions results in biased estimates of conditional inequality, however, because
the relationship between inequality and the multivariate correlations with
respect to demographic, geographical, and job attributes not used (or
not used fully) in the imputation process will be biased (Hirsch and Schu-
macher 2004; Bollinger and Hirsch 2006). Data from the DER are partic-
ularly helpful here both because we can fill in the missing ASEC earnings
with the DER and because, unlike the public-release and internal versions
of ASEC, earnings from the DER are not top coded, which improves our
estimates of the importance of nonresponse in the right tail of the earn-
ings distribution.
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We are not the first to examine nonresponse using a validation study
or to find deviations from MAR, but prior studies are generally old, use
small samples, and/or examine restricted populations (e.g.,married white
males). Most similar to our initial analysis is a paper by Greenlees, Reece,
andZieschang (1982), who examined the 1973ASEC and compared wage-
and-salary earnings the previous year with 1972 linked income tax rec-
ords of full-time, full-year male heads of households in the private non-
agricultural sector whose spouse did not work. They found evidence that
selection into response declined weakly with respect to earnings. No dis-
tributional analysis was provided. David et al. (1986) conducted a related
validation study using the 1981 ASEC linked to 1980 IRS reports, also find-
ing evidence of negative selection into response. More recently, Kline and
Santos (2013) examined whether returns to schooling and other earnings-
equation parameters are sensitive to departures from the MAR assump-
tion, using the exactmatch of the 1973 ASEC linked to IRS earnings data.
They provided evidence that missing data probabilities among men are
U-shaped, with very low andhighwagemen least likely to report.Hokayem,
Bollinger, and Ziliak (2015) used the linked ASEC-DER data to examine
how treatment of nonrespondents affects family poverty rate estimates and
noted the U-shaped nonresponse pattern. Although informative and sug-
gestive, it is not known whether results from studies that examined response
bias using older data can be generalized outside their time period and nar-
row demographic samples. In short, there is little validation evidence using
recent data to examine the extent and consequences of CPS nonresponse
bias across the earnings distribution. Given the increasing rates of nonre-
sponse over time, it is important to know whether nonresponse is ignor-
able and, if not, the size and patterns of bias.
In general, we find that nonresponse is not ignorable—earnings are
not missing at random, even conditional on a rich set of covariates—and as
we allude to in the title, the highest rates of nonresponse are in the tails
of the earnings distribution.While on average,male (female) nonrespon-
dents have slightly higher (lower) earnings than respondents, nonresponse
is not simply an up or down shift in the distribution. Individuals with earn-
ings that differ substantially from the average (either the gross or condi-
tional mean) are the most likely not to report earnings. This U-shaped pat-
tern is in evidence across gender, race, ethnicity, employment status (hourly
and full time, full year), month-in-sample, proxy earnings status, and panel
status (year 1 or year 2).
Our finding of NMAR suggests that reliance on respondent samples
(even if reweighted) alsomay provide biased estimates of population earn-
ings. While we find the impact of nonresponse bias on averages is small,
the bias on conditional quantile estimates of gender, race, and education
earnings gaps associated with very high or low earnings is upward of 20 per-
cent and statistically significant. Moreover, between one-third and one-half
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the difference in inequality measures between the CPS and administra-
tive data is accounted for by nonresponse in the CPS.We conclude by dem-
onstrating that public users of the ASEC can approximate the population
distribution of earnings using a copula-based selection model recently pro-
posed by Arellano and Bonhomme (2017).
II. Earnings Nonresponse and Response Bias
Official government statistics, as well as most research analyzing earnings
(and income) differences, include both respondents and nonrespondents,
replacing the missing earnings with an imputed value. Researchers typi-
cally assume (usually implicitly) that nonresponse does not produce sys-
tematic biases in the measurement of earnings. The aim of our paper is to
determine whether this assumption is justified.
Formally the ignorability of missing earnings underlying the MAR as-
sumption is a statement about the joint distribution of earnings (Y ) and
response status (R), conditional on covariates (X ):
f Y , R jXð Þ 5 f Y jXð Þ * f ðR jX Þ, (1)
which means that once we condition on known covariates, earnings and
response status are independent. Because the Bayes theorem permits us
to relate the joint distribution of (Y, R) to conditional distributions re-
gardless of whether MAR holds, we can write the joint distribution as
f Y , R jXð Þ 5 f Y jR , Xð Þ * f R jXð Þ 5 f R jY , Xð Þ * f ðY jX Þ: (2)
The implication of MAR is then readily seen by equating equations (1)
and (2):
f Y jR , Xð Þ 5 f ðY X Þ and f R jY , Xð Þ 5 f ðRj jX Þ:
If either of these conditions fails, then the MAR assumption fails. When
the only data available are survey reports, one method for testing for the
presence of nonresponse bias across the joint distribution in equation (2)
is to treat response as a form of sample selection and to estimate a flexible
quantile model via copula methods ( Joe 2014; Arellano and Bonhomme
2017). Bollinger and Hirsch (2013) adopted a restrictive version of this
approach by estimating the conditional mean of earnings controlling for
selection via a standard two-stepHeckman (1979)method. Below we dem-
onstrate the efficacy of the copula-based method to recover the unbiased
distribution of earnings using respondents only, but the main analysis in
this study takes advantage of our access to linked administrative earnings
for both respondents and nonrespondents, permitting direct tests of non-
response bias via validation methods.
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Specifically, because theMAR assumption is conditioned on covariates,
it is sufficient to test MAR by focusing on the conditional distributions
on the right-hand side of equation (2). Simply put, does response status de-
pend on earnings or does the distribution of earnings depend on response
status? For the former we estimate models of the form
Pr Ri 5 1jY DERi , Xið Þ 5 F a 1 gY DERi 1 Xibð Þ, (3)
where Y DERi is administrative earnings reports from the DER described
in the next section. Because of the very large number of covariates we re-
strict these tests to parametric estimators (probit and linear probability)
so that a test that f ðR jY , X Þ 5 f ðR jX Þ amounts to a test of g 5 0. We con-
sider specifications that control for Y DERi in both logarithmic form and
flexible percentiles, as well as models that relax separability betweenY DERi
and Xi. Greenlees et al. (1982) and David et al. (1986) implemented tests
along the lines of equation (3) as it provides the simplest and most straight-
forward way to answer the question of independence. Since R is a binary
variable, its entire distribution is summarized by PrðR 5 1jY , X Þ. If earn-
ings have any predictive power, then earnings and response are not inde-
pendent and the MAR assumption fails.
For the test of conditional independence of earnings from response
we estimate both parametric and nonparametric models of the form
Y DERi 5 d 1 vRi 1 Xip 1 ui: (4)
Summary measures of f ðY jR , X Þ are the key for understanding sample se-
lection whenY is the dependent variable in a regression. Unlike f ðR jY , X Þ,
the conditional distribution of earnings given response may be summa-
rized by a variety of parameters (e.g., mean, median, quantiles, variance,
and skewness) that describe different features of the distribution, such as
center, spread, or symmetry. The classic paper by Heckman (1979) and later
papers (for a survey, see Vella [1998]) suggest that a key parameter is
E ½Y jR 5 1, X , in which case the test that f ðY jR , X Þ 5 f ðY jX Þ amounts
to a test of v 5 0. When the regression of interest is a quantile regres-
sion such as the median or other percentiles, it is less clear what the most
important parameters will be. For the nonparametric models we estimate
kernel density functions separately for respondents and nonrespondents
and conduct Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the null that f ðY jR 5 1, X Þ5
f ðY jR 5 0, X Þ. Rejecting the null of equality is a sufficient condition to
reject the hypothesis that f ðY jR , X Þ5 f ðY jX Þ.
III. Data: The ASEC-DER Link Files
The data used in our analysis are restricted-access CPS ASEC person rec-
ords linked to the Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record
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(DER) for survey years 2006–11 (reporting earnings for calendar years
2005–10).4 The ASEC is a survey of roughly 60,000 households (plus an
additional 30,000 households as part of the Children’s Health Insurance
Program) conducted in March of each year. It serves as the source of of-
ficial federal statistics on income, poverty, inequality, and health insurance
coverage, and has been the workhorse data set for earnings-inequality re-
search in the United States. The primary difference between the internal
ASEC we use and the version available publicly is that the internal file has
higher top-code values on income components (Larrimore et al. 2008).
We link the internal ASEC to the DER file, which is an extract of theMaster
Earnings File and includes data on total earnings as reported on a work-
er’s W-2 form, wages and salaries and income from self-employment sub-
ject to Federal Insurance Contributions Act and/or Self-Employment
Contributions Act taxation, as well as deferred wage (tax) contributions to
401(k), 403(b), 408(k), 457(b), and 501(c) retirement and trust plans, all
of whichwe include inourearningsmeasure.Onlypositive self-employment
earnings are reported in the DER because individuals do not make self-
employment tax contributions if they have self-employment losses (Nich-
olas and Wiseman 2009). In addition, some parts of gross compensation
do not appear in the DER file such as pretax health insurance premiums
and education benefits (Abowd and Stinson 2013), nor do “off the books”
earnings appear in the DER, though they could be reported in the ASEC.5
Unlike the internal ASEC earnings records, DER earnings are not top
coded.6 This is important given substantial concerns regarding nonre-
sponse and response bias in the right tail of the distribution.
The principal sample used in our analysis includes civilian wage-and-
salary workers ages 18 to 65 who have reported or imputed positive earn-
ings in the prior year. We exclude workers who are full-time students, as
well as a small number of workers identified in the ASEC and linked to
the DER who show zero DER earnings but positive deferred compensa-
tion. We also exclude individuals with whole imputations of the ASEC,
that is, those for whom all ASEC supplement data are imputed. We provide
4 The linked ASEC-DER files were obtained as part of an internal-to-Census project and
analyzed in a secure facility at the US Census Bureau in Suitland, MD. Researchers out-
side the Census Bureau interested in accessing such data must have their project approved
by the bureau and the Social Security Administration for analysis conducted in a secure
Federal Statistical Research Data Center. For more information, see https://www.census
.gov/fsrdc.
5 Whether survey reports of earnings differ from tax reports is an important, open issue.
Recent evidence in Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2014) suggests that among the self-employed,
survey and tax reports do not differ substantively, but whether this holds for the general
labor force is not established and should be the subject of future research.
6 Confidentiality protections preclude us from disclosing individual earnings values such as
the maximum earnings values in the DER. The two components of our internal ASEC total
earnings variable—earnings on the primary job and all other earnings—are each capped at
$1.1 million.
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a separate analysis of this subsample in the appendix, which is available
as an online supplement. The full sample, including those with no ASEC-
DER link, consists of 508,288 individuals (270,409 men and 237,879 women).
Since a worker can appear multiple times per year in the DER file if
they havemultiple jobs, we collapse the DER file into one earnings obser-
vation per worker per year by aggregating total earnings (box 1 of theW-2,
labeled “wages, tips, other compensation”), total self-employment earn-
ings, and total deferred contributions across all employers. In this way,
DER earnings are most compatible with ASEC earnings from all wage-and-
salary jobs (WSAL-VAL) plus nonnegative self-employment earnings. We
classify a worker as having imputed earnings if wage-and-salary income
from the longest job (I-ERNVAL), from other jobs (I-WSVAL), or from self-
employment earnings is imputed. For much of our analysis, we focus
on annual earnings because this measure is available in both the ASEC and
DER, but we also examine earnings among full-time, full-year workers, as
well as average hourly earnings found by dividing annual ASEC or DER
earnings by annual hours worked. Annual hours worked is constructed
by multiplying weeks worked (WKSWORK) by the usual hours worked per
week (HRSWK); these ASEC labor-market measures are available for earn-
ings nonrespondents as well as respondents.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our full sample in column 1,
weighted by the ASEC person supplement weight. The average worker is
41 years old, slightly more likely to be a male, and has an average of nearly
14yearsofeducation.Themajorityaremarriedwith spousepresent (58per-
cent), native born (84 percent), and work full time, full year (71 percent).
Nonresponse to either the wage-and-salary questions or the self-employment
earnings question totals 23 percent of the sample. Nonresponse is con-
centrated on the wage-and-salary questions (22 percent) largely because
relatively few individuals are self-employed. ASEC interviews identify for
each household a single respondent who provides information about other
members of the household; hence, 48 percent of the earnings responses
are proxy responses, an issue we return to in a subsequent section. Inflation-
adjusted ASEC total earnings are $45,897, while average real DER earnings
are a higher $48,478.
Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics for the sample broken down
by ASEC response status and by DER link status. In general, nonrespon-
dents are not markedly different from the full sample (or the respondent
sample). They are slightly less likely to be a Hispanic or a female, more
likely to be never married, and more likely to be full-time, full-year work-
ers. In both the ASEC and the DER measures, nonrespondents have
slightly higher annual earnings. It is unsurprising that the ASEC differ-
ence is small since the imputed earnings derive from the earnings of the
respondents. On average, 86 percent of the ASEC sample is successfully
linked to the DER, though appendix figure 1 demonstrates that the linkage
rate is considerably lower at low earnings, rising from about 72 percent
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TABLE 1
Sample Averages by Response Status and by Linkage Status
Response Status
Linkage Status
Full
Sample Respondent
Non-
respondent Linked Nonlinked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 41.4 41.3 41.8 41.7 39.6
Race/ethnicity:
White, non-Hispanic 68.7 69.3 66.4 71.8 49.0
Black, non-Hispanic 10.6 9.9 13.0 10.6 10.9
Asian, non-Hispanic 4.5 4.3 5.2 4.2 6.2
Other race, non-Hispanic 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.7
Hispanic 14.4 14.5 13.7 11.5 32.2
Gender:
Female 46.8 47.5 44.7 47.9 39.9
Education (years) 13.7 13.7 13.6 13.9 12.6
Marital status:
Married, spouse present 57.6 58.5 54.3 58.9 49.4
Married, spouse absent 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.6 18.6
Single, never married 25.6 24.6 28.9 24.5 32.0
Nativity:
Native 84.2 84.5 83.4 87.6 63.6
Foreign born, US citizen 6.5 6.3 7.2 6.3 7.7
Foreign born, not a US
citizen 9.2 9.2 9.4 6.1 28.8
Employment:
Full time, full year 71.2 70.6 73.4 72.3 64.3
Work hours (per week) 39.9 40.0 39.8 40.2 38.5
Nonresponse:
Nonresponse rate
(wages and salaries or
self-employment income) 22.6 0 100 20.1 38.0
Nonresponse rate
(wages and salaries) 22.4 0 99.1 19.9 37.9
Linkage rate 86.2 88.9 76.7 100 0
Proxy 48.0 45.1 58.1 47.2 53.1
ASEC total earnings
(2010 dollars) 45,897 45,838 46,099 47,665 34,884
DER total earnings
(2010 dollars) 48,478 47,895 50,796 48,478 NA
DER average hourly total
earnings (2010 dollars) 25.61 25.45 28.70 26.10 NA
Observations 508,288 399,823 108,465 440,227 68,061
Sources.—US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
Note.—This table shows sample descriptive statistics for the full sample and broken down
by ASEC response status and ASEC-DER linkage status. Full ASEC averages include im-
puted nonrespondent earnings. Each average is weighted by the ASEC supplement weight.
For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and def-
initions, see https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/techdocs/cpsmar17.pdf.
to 92 percent across the ASEC earnings distribution. In table 1, the non-
linked sample shows more striking differences from the full sample than
the nonrespondent sample. Individuals for whom a link was not found
are 2 years younger, 8 percentage points more likely to bemale, and have
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1.3 fewer years of education. Most notably they are more than twice as
likely to be Hispanic, and over three times more likely to be foreign born
and not a citizen. Nonlinked workers are almost twice as likely to be an
earnings nonrespondent, and they report ASEC earnings nearly $13,000
lower than those reported by linked workers.
In appendix tables 1 and 2 we document that link failure between ASEC
and DER is concentrated among noncitizen immigrants. Because the opt-
out rate to agree to link the ASEC and DER is a trivial 0.5 percent, most
link failures are due to lack of personally identifiable information used in
constructing a linkage indicator. To address this, we estimate a saturated
probit model of the probability of an ASEC-DER link as a function of a
full array of demographic characteristics, including nativity, Hispanic eth-
nicity, and their interaction (see appendix table 3). As described in the
appendix, we then use the fitted values to construct inverse-probability
weights (IPWs) to rebalance the ASEC-DER linked sample for the miss-
ing nonlink sample (i.e., the ratio of the ASEC weight to the fitted prob-
ability of a link). Because most of the linkage failures are not due to an
opt-out choice by the respondent and instead are accounted for by ob-
served demographics, we believe any potential bias from selection on un-
observables, which would not be corrected by IPWs, is minimal.
IV. Is Response a Function of Earnings, and Are
Earnings a Function of Response?
We begin our analysis by examining the conditional distribution of re-
sponse given earnings, where in table 2 we present estimates of equa-
tion (3) using the linked ASEC-DER sample and both unweighted and
IPW linear-probability models.7 In this first test, we begin by conditioning
only on the logarithm of DER earnings. Columns 1 and 2 do not control
for any confounders, while in columns 3 and 4 we control for a rich a set
of covariates in Xi, including a quartic in potential experience, race, mar-
ital status, citizenship, education, metropolitan area size, occupation, in-
dustry, and year. Column 4 also interacts the covariates with DER earnings,
relaxing separability. We recognize that this is a relatively simple model
of the joint distribution, so subsequent analysis moves from use of a single
linear log earnings term to categorical measures for earnings percentiles
that allow for different responses throughout the distribution. This allows
for a less parametric relationship between nonresponse and earnings.
The results in table 2 suggest an average tendency of positive rather
than negative selection into response. That said, the coefficients for both
men and women are close to zero (with or without controls). The effect
of DER earnings for men with controls is a precisely estimated 20.014
7 Probit models yield observationally equivalent marginal effects to the linear-probability
models presented.
2154 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 160.036.194.071 on August 03, 2020 07:30:46 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
(a 10 percent increase in earnings decreases the probability of nonre-
sponse by just over a tenth of a percentage point). The effect for women
is roughly half that size (20.008). Although these results provide what we
believe are accurate measures of central tendency for these broad sam-
ples of men and women, our results for men appear to be just the oppo-
site of that found by Greenlees et al. (1982), who found negative selection
into response. Their small sample of married white men with nonwork-
ing spouses in 1972, however, is not representative of today’s workforce.
In order to compare our estimates with those of Greenlees et al., in re-
sults not shown we create a similar sample restricted to married white
male citizens with spouse present. Unlike Greenlees et al., we include
those with working spouses since married women’s labor force participa-
tion is now closer to the norm rather than the exception. In contrast to
the negative coefficients on log earnings for all men, using the restrictive
married white male sample flips the signs and produces positive coeffi-
cients, meaning negative selection into response. The latter results are
TABLE 2
ASEC Mean Nonresponse with Respect to DER Earnings
for Men and Women, 2006–11
OLS
Unweighted Weighted
Weighted,
with X ’s
Weighted, with X ’s
Interacted with DER
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men
ln EarningsDER 2.017*** 2.018*** 2.014*** 2.012***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Constant .374*** .398*** .436*** .401***
(.009) (.011) (.017) (.054)
Observations 224,852 224,852 224,852 224,852
R2 .002 .002 .018 .019
Women
ln EarningsDER 2.009*** 2.010*** 2.008*** 2.008***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Constant .276*** .292*** .349*** .412
(.008) (.010) (.017) (.051)
Observations 214,869 214,869 214,869 214,869
R2 .001 .001 .015 .016
Sources.—US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
Note.—This table showsOLS estimation of eq. (3) described in Sec. IV of the text. Cols. 1
and 2 include a single control, ln EarningsDER. Cols. 3 and 4 include additional controls
for potential experience, race,marital status, citizenship, education,metropolitan area size,
occupation, industry, and year. Col. 4 interacts these controls with ln EarningsDER. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Weighted estimates are weighted using inverse-probability
weights for ASEC-DER linkage.
*** Significance p < .01.
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qualitatively consistent with Greenlees et al., as well as previous studies
finding negative selection into response, though again we emphasize that
their sample is not representative of the modern labor force.
A. Nonresponse across the DER Distribution
Rather than focusing on central tendency, it is more informative to exam-
ine how nonresponse varies across the distribution. Grouping observa-
tions by DER earnings centile for the linked sample and estimating non-
response rates for each centile (by gender) produces nonresponse rates
that vary across the distribution nonparametrically. Panel A of figure 2
plots these results for the entire sample (smoothed using 3 percentile point
moving averages). We note that the highest nonresponse rates are for
men through the lowest 30 centiles (as high as 28 percent) and for both
men and women at the highest 5 centiles, reaching 25 percent. Through-
out the middle of the distribution, the graph is relatively flat. This is sug-
gestive of our main result—“trouble is in the tails”—which is underscored
in more dramatic fashion in panels B and C of figure 2. In panel B we
focus on earnings among full-time, full-year workers, and in panel C we
adjust for hours of work regardless of work status and depict nonresponse
rates across the distribution of average real hourly earnings. Here the
“trouble in the tails” is most evident: nonresponse rates rise dramatically
in the left and right tails. Although similar to panel A, in panel C both
men and women in the highest centiles have nonresponse rates reaching
30 percent. Through the middle of the distribution, however, the nonre-
sponse rates are remarkably flat. The linear models reported in table 4
will necessarily fit this part of the distribution, thus explaining the ap-
parent absence of substantive nonresponse bias when focusing on cen-
tral tendency. The less pronounced trouble in the lower tails in panel A,
which includes part-time and part-year workers, is largely explained by
the fact that low earnings are caused not only by low pay but also by few
weeks worked and low weekly hours. Both panels B and C adjust for an-
nual hours and thus reveal a more striking pattern of U-shaped nonre-
sponse across the distribution.8 In short, nonresponse in the left tail is
associated primarily with a low wage, not low earnings resulting from
low hours worked. This pattern is widespread. Appendix figures 2–4 show
that U-shaped patterns hold across race, ethnicity, interview month, and
proxy report status.
8 Reported hours are concentrated at 2080 (full-time, full-year). While nonresponse is
somewhat higher for workers at 2080 hours (3 percentage points), there is no other obvious
pattern across hours worked. Mean annual hours worked systematically increase across the
DER earnings distribution, as expected. That said, for those with low DER earnings, mean
hours worked are substantial, about 1000 hours for men and 650 for women in the lowest
3 earnings percentiles. This suggests that hours worked are not driving the U-shape.
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The nonresponse rates in figure 2 donot control for other factors, many
of which are known to be associated with earnings and nonresponse. To
address this, we modify the nonresponse equation specification seen pre-
viously in table 2 by grouping the bottom 90 percent of earners into earn-
ings deciles, while breaking up the top decile into finer percentile
increments. Table 3 presents results both with and without human capi-
tal, demographic, and location controls, separately for men and women.
In all cases, we include a full set of decile/percentile dummy variables,
rather than including an intercept. Hence, each coefficient provides an
estimate of the nonresponse rate at the given DER earnings level. Read-
ily evident from the coefficients is that nonresponse rates are not con-
stant across the distribution, with the highest earnings deciles producing
the highest nonresponse. The U-shapes are highly similar with and with-
out controls.9 Among men, the lowest decile has a 14 percent nonresponse
rate, while the typical range through the rest of the distribution is roughly
FIG. 2.—Nonresponse rates by gender for joint DER earnings distribution. A, Earnings:
all workers. B, Earnings: full-time, full-year workers. C, Average hourly earnings: all work-
ers. Each panel shows the nonresponse rate for a 3 point moving percentile average across
a common DER earnings distribution for men and women. The nonresponse rate is
weighted using inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage. Sources: US Census Bu-
reau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and Economic Supplement; So-
cial Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
9 Note that our unconditioned figures showing nonresponse rates across the earnings
distribution also have been constructed conditioned on a detailed set of covariates. While
conditioning affects the level of nonresponse, curvature of the conditioned and uncondi-
tioned nonresponse figures is indistinguishable to the eye.
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half that at 6.5 percent to 7.5 percent. For men in the highest 3 percen-
tiles, the nonresponse rate again rises over 14 percent with the top 1 per-
cent having a 19 percent nonresponse rate. For women, the results with
controls are less pronounced, but again we see the U-shape. At the low-
est decile, the nonresponse rate is 12 percent, while through the middle
TABLE 3
ASEC Nonresponse across the DER Earnings Distribution
for Men and Women, 2006–11
OLS
Men Women
DER Earnings
Deciles and
Percentiles
Earnings Decile
Dummies
Earnings Decile
Dummies and X ’s
Earnings Decile
Dummies
Earnings Decile
Dummies and X ’s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decile 10 .267*** .140*** .213*** .120***
(.004) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Decile 20 .253*** .130*** .214*** .119***
(.004) (.009) (.004) (.009)
Decile 30 .217*** .098*** .202*** .109***
(.003) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Decile 40 .210*** .095*** .198*** .107***
(.003) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Decile 50 .189*** .074*** .194*** .103***
(.003) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Decile 60 .179*** .064*** .184*** .095***
(.003) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Decile 70 .178*** .065*** .180*** .094***
(.003) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Decile 80 .176*** .064*** .174*** .089***
(.003) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Decile 90 .185*** .073*** .176*** .091***
(.003) (.009) (.003) (.009)
Percentiles 91–95 .200*** .088*** .176*** .090***
(.004) (.010) (.004) (.010)
Percentile 96 .199*** .086*** .197*** .106***
(.010) (.013) (.010) (.013)
Percentile 97 .227*** .111*** .193*** .102***
(.011) (.014) (.010) (.013)
Percentile 98 .252*** .133*** .183*** .091***
(.011) (.014) (.010) (.013)
Percentile 99 .271*** .149*** .189*** .097***
(.011) (.014) (.010) (.013)
Percentile 100 .320*** .192*** .243*** .146***
(.011) (.015) (.011) (.014)
Observations 224,852 224,852 214,869 214,869
R2 .212 .225 .192 .204
Sources.—US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
Note.—This table shows OLS estimation of eq. (3), which includes DER earnings decile
dummy variables described in Sec. IV.A of the text. Cols. 1 and 3 include only decile dummy
variables, while cols. 2 and 4 add controls described in table 2. Robust standard errors in pa-
rentheses. Estimates are weighted using inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage.
*** Significance p < .01.
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of the distribution it falls to around 9 percent, and in the highest percen-
tile, it rises to 14 percent. While we do not reject the null hypothesis that
these rates are equal through the middle of the decile range (40th through
70th deciles), we do reject the null that all deciles are equal.
Our final evidence in this section is to show nonresponse rates for men
and women with respect to percentiles across the predicted earnings dis-
tribution, seen in figure 3. We do this to test whether or not the U-shape
is largely a result of observable covariates. The linked ASEC-DER sample
is used to estimate conditional mean earnings equations along the lines
of equation (4) using the same rich set of demographic controls, as well
as controls for both full-time/part-time and full-year/part-year status. The
predicted DER earnings for each worker, which can be thought of as an
“attribute index,” are then used similarly to the actual DER wage in fig-
ure 2. Workers are grouped by (3 point moving average) centile, and the
resulting nonresponse rate is plotted, along with a smoothed quadratic
trend function. Panel A of figure 3 makes it clear that nonresponse is
somewhat higher in the tails of the attribute distribution of men compared
to that in women in panel B. For the most part, though, nonresponse for
FIG. 3.—Nonresponse rate by predicted DER earnings. A, Men. B, Women. Each panel
shows the nonresponse rate for a 3 point moving average across the predicted DER earn-
ings distribution, along with a smoothed polynomial. The nonresponse rate is weighted us-
ing inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage. Predicted DER earnings come from
an OLS estimation of equation (4) described in Section IV.A in the text. Sources: US Cen-
sus Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and Economic Supplement;
Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
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men and women demonstrates less of a U-shape across the attribute dis-
tribution than it does across the earnings distribution. The U-shaped non-
response (i.e., trouble in the tails) is not driven primarily by observable
earnings attributes; rather, it results from the realization of either very low
or very high earnings.
B. DER Earnings Residuals across the Distribution
We next examine the distribution of earnings conditional on response and
earnings covariates, f ðY jR , X Þ, again using the linked ASEC-DER data
with inverse-probability weights. We estimate earnings regressions speci-
fied in equation (4) using ln EarningsDERi , and in figure 4 provide kernel
density estimates of residuals for respondents and nonrespondents.
The left panel of figure 4 presents the administrative earnings distribu-
tions by ASEC response status amongmen, while the right panel does so for
women. In both panels, peaks of the respondent distribution are higher
than peaks of the nonrespondent distribution. Similarly, the tails of the
nonrespondent distribution are generally longer, indicating a higher vari-
ance for nonrespondents. Appendix table 4 supports this, demonstrating
FIG. 4.—Residuals of log earnings regressions by ASEC response status and gender. A, Male
kernel density of residuals; kernel 5 Epanechnikov, bandwidth 5 0.0475. B, Female kernel
density of residuals; kernel 5 Epanechnikov, bandwidth 5 0.0502. Each panel shows the
kernel density estimate of residuals for respondent and nonrespondent distributions. Resid-
uals come from an OLS estimation of equation (4) described in Section IV.B in the text and
appendix A.5. The OLS estimation uses inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage.
Sources: US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and Eco-
nomic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
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that the variance for male (female) nonrespondents is 1.37 (1.12) times
the variance of male (female) respondents. Testing differences between
these variances using either the standard F -test or Levine’s test rejects the
null hypothesis of equivalence at conventional levels. Tests for differences
in means reject the null hypothesis as well. A simple test of the difference
in the medians fails to reject for men, but does reject for women. Examin-
ing the percentiles shows that the major differences occur in the tails, as
seen in figure 4. We conclude that there is strong evidence of differences
between these distributions, with the most substantive differences in the
variances and percentiles. Furthermore, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject
the null (p-value < 0:00) that f ðY jR 5 1, X Þ 5 f ðY jR 5 0, X Þ, which is a
sufficient condition to reject the hypothesis that f ðY jR , X Þ5 f ðY jX Þ.
C. Proxy Respondents and Measurement Error
Census interviewers designate a single person to be the respondent for
all household members in a bid to lower the time and money costs of con-
ducting household surveys. Although a single person is recorded as pro-
viding answers to survey questions, the designee may rely on input from
other household members in providing requested information. In the ASEC
sample used in our analysis, 54 percent of men have their earnings reported
by a proxy, while 42 percent of women rely on proxy reports.10 As seen in
appendix figure 4, earnings nonresponse is substantially higher among
individuals with proxy earnings responses than among self-respondents. For
our combined sample of women and men, earnings nonresponse rates are
24.2 percent for proxy respondents versus 16.4 percent for self-respondents.
The gap in nonresponse rates between proxies and self-respondents is
about 2 percentage points greater among men than among women; this
gap varies little across the earnings distribution.
There exists rather limited information on the reliability of proxy earn-
ings responses (Mellow and Sider 1983; Lee and Lee 2012; Reynolds and
Wenger 2012).Using the linkedASEC-DER sample, we canobservewhether
administrative earnings in the DER, where there are no proxies, vary with
respect to proxy use in the ASEC. That is, we estimate two equations, each
separately for men and women: (1) an ASEC wage equation with spouse
and nonspouse proxy variables and (2) a DER wage equation with ASEC
spouse and nonspouse proxy variables. Each wage regression also controls
for a saturated set of confounders. The proxy variables in the DER equa-
tion act as “phantom” dummies; if ASEC proxy coefficients only measured
10 We designate a response as a proxy response when an individual’s line number differs
from the line number of the household respondent. This method is not 100 percent accu-
rate. Census identifies a respondent at the end of an interview. If there has been a change
in the respondent after the survey collects earnings information, this method need not
identify correctly the household member providing the earnings information.
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reporting differences between proxies and self-respondents, the DER proxy
coefficients should be zero. Proxy coefficients in ASEC wage equations
reflect the combined effects of proxy misreporting and worker hetero-
geneity. Inclusion of phantom ASEC proxy variables in DER adminis-
trative earnings regressions thus provides estimates of worker earnings
heterogeneity correlated with proxy status (conditional on measured attri-
butes). Thus, in order to estimate proxy misreporting error, we simply
subtract the DER phantom proxy coefficients from the corresponding
ASEC proxy coefficients. Note that we exclude imputed earners since we
cannotknowwhether the donor’s earnings used in the ASEC imputation
were self-reported or from a proxy.
These results are summarized in columns 5 and 6 of table 4, using
both a single proxy variable and distinguishing between spouse and non-
spouse proxies. In general, the DER and ASEC proxy coefficients differ
substantively, particularly so in the male regressions. In models with a sin-
gle proxy variable (i.e., proxy use versus self-response), we find that prox-
ies understate both men’s annual earnings and men’s hourly earnings by
0.062 log points. Underreporting of men’s earnings are moderately larger
when there are nonspouse rather than spousal proxies. For women, under-
reporting by proxies is a comparatively small 0.014 log points. Underre-
porting by nonspouse proxies is about a third larger than by spouse prox-
ies. One clear result from this analysis is that inclusion of dummies for
spouse and nonspouse proxy reports captures substantive unobserved het-
erogeneity, as seen by the DER coefficients. Both women and men with
earnings reported by spousal proxies have higher administrative (DER) earn-
ings (note that we control for marital status in all earnings equations).
The substantive underreporting of men’s wages and earnings by proxies,
coupled with minimal underreporting of women’s earnings, has obvious
implications for measurement of the gender gap, which is frequently mea-
sured using the CPS.11 From above, the difference-in-difference in the male-
female earnings gap from proxy reports is 0.048 log points (0:062 2 0:014).
Were all earnings reported by proxies, these results would imply that the
gender gap is understated by the full 0.048 log points. Based on sample
averages of proxy use among men of 54.4 percent and 41.5 percent among
women, a back-of-the-envelope calculation implies that gender-asymmetric
underreporting of earnings by proxies understates the gender wage gap
by about 0.028 logpoints (0:544  0:0621 2 0:415  0:0145 5 0:0278), or
about 14 percent of the regression-adjusted ASEC averagewage gap of .20
(the adjusted DER gender gap is .19). We return to the gender gap in a
later section, focusing on the gap across the distribution using quantile
models.
11 Blau and Kahn (2017) provide a comprehensive survey of the gender wage gap, with a
focus on CPS estimates.
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We conclude this section with a brief discussion of differences in the
reported earnings in the ASEC and in the DER. Empirical investigation of
measurement error in earnings in the CPS and other surveys has a long
history (Herriot and Spiers 1975; Halsey 1978; Alvey and Cobleigh 1980;
Mellow and Sider 1983; Duncan and Hill 1985; Poterba and Summers
1986; Rogers and Herzog 1987; Mathiowetz and Duncan 1988; Marquis
and Moore 1990; Bound and Krueger 1991; Bound et al. 1994; Bollinger
1998; Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001; Roemer 2002). The goal of
this exercise is to examine the relationship between the survey respondents
for those with linked surveys using nonparametric kernel regression. We
use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate models of both ASEC and
DER earnings on the same covariates as previously, and the residuals from
each model are then used for the nonparametric regression of ASEC on
DER. Appendix figure 5, using a log-earnings scale, shows that the “com-
mon man” hypothesis (i.e., mean reverting measurement error) found in
the validation literature is supported: individuals with low earnings tend
to overreport their earnings, while individuals with high earnings tend to
underreport. Since this analysis was conducted on residuals, these are
TABLE 4
Proxy Misreporting of Male and Female Annual and Hourly Earnings
Based on CPS-ASEC and DER Differences in Proxy Coefficients
Variable
CPS-ASEC DER CPS Proxy Misreport
Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual earnings:
Earnings equations with proxy coefficients:
Proxy 2.0638 .0502 2.0017 .0647 2.0621 2.0145
Earnings equations with spouse and nonspouse proxy coefficients:
Spouse proxy .0233 .1210 .0807 .1330 2.0574 2.0120
Nonspouse proxy 2.2010 2.0576 2.1320 2.0392 2.0690 2.0184
Hourly earnings:
Wage equations with proxy coefficients:
Proxy 2.0501 .0031 .0117 .0172 2.0618 2.0141
Wage equations with spouse and nonspouse proxy coefficients:
Spouse proxy 2.0091 .0360 .0483 .0476 2.0574 2.0116
Nonspouse proxy 2.1150 2.0473 2.0459 2.0289 2.0691 2.0184
Sources.— US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
Note.—This table shows the OLS estimation of earnings and wage regressions that in-
clude controls for proxy, spouse proxy, and nonspouse proxy. Cols. 1 and 2 use ASEC earn-
ings, while cols. 3 and 4 use DER earnings. CPS proxy misreporting estimates (cols. 5 and
6) are calculated as the difference between the ASEC and DER proxy coefficients (col. 1
minus col. 3 for men and col. 2 minus col. 4 for women). See Sec. IV.C in the text for fur-
ther explanation. The CPS-ASEC equations exclude imputed earners since we cannot know
whether the donor’s earnings were self-reported or from a proxy. The DER equations in-
clude the same sample. All columns include additional controls described in table 2. Esti-
mates are weighted using inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage.
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not associated with demographic characteristics such as education or
race. This evidence provides some interesting qualifications on our main
finding that nonresponse is concentrated in the tails of the distribution.
Here we see that for respondents, measurement error is also concen-
trated in the tails of the distribution. Previous authors (Bollinger and Da-
vid 2001; Kapteyn and Ypma 2007) have found similar overlaps in the
population of “noncooperative” survey respondents. This suggests, per-
haps, that theCensus imputation proceduremay reflect the response that
typical nonrespondents would make, were they to participate, measure-
ment error and all. It does, however, highlight that individuals in the ex-
treme parts of the earnings distribution (both unconditional and condi-
tional) are not responding to the survey in ways we might hope. Our prior
results show that many simply do not respond, while appendix figure 5
shows that those who do respond are not appropriately revealing their
earnings. This evidence adds support to the idea that survey response and
nonresponse are correlated with the level of income, even controlling for
demographic factors.
D. Earnings Nonresponse over Time and Earnings Growth
One advantage of the rotation group structure of the ASEC is the over-
lapping nature of the sample, allowing up to 50 percent of sample indi-
viduals to be followed across adjacent years. There is a small literature
examining either measurement error or nonresponse in panel settings
(Bound and Krueger 1991; Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt 1998; Bound
et al. 2001; Bollinger and David 2005). We briefly examine the rates of
nonresponse for the 2 year panels covered by our data, the relationship
between earnings and nonresponse, and the impact of nonresponse on
simple measures of earnings growth. Several authors (Peracchi and Welch
1995; Cameron and Tracy 1998; Hardy and Ziliak 2014) have pointed out
that the subsample of individuals who can be followed across adjacent
years in the ASEC are not fully representative because the sample frame
is the household address and not the person, and thus movers are not
followed. Nonetheless, the longitudinal sample is widely used and thus
it is important to assess nonresponse, and indeed, as appendix table 6
demonstrates, there are few observable differences between the panel
and cross-sectional samples. We find that the linkage rate for panel indi-
viduals rises to 88.3 percent (compared to 87.4 percent for the full ASEC
sample). The earnings nonresponse rate is 16.9 percent in year 1 of the
panel and 18.2 percent in year 2, as compared to 22.6 percent in the full
cross-section sample.
Column 1 of table 5 presents the (unweighted) response status in the
first year, cross-tabulated with the response status in the second year.
Overall, 72.8 percent of the sample responds in both years and 7.9 percent
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does not respond in either year. The joint-year response rate is of course
lower than the single-year response rates (83.1 percent in the first and
81.8 percent in the second year, as reported in appendix table 6). Many
individuals change their response status and such changes are approxi-
mately symmetric. We find that 10 percent of individuals respond in the
first year but become nonrespondents in the second year; 9 percent of
individuals do not respond in year 1 but then do so in year 2. Figure 5
displays panel nonresponse rates plotted against the DER earnings centile
for the first year in the panel. Panel A combines full-time, full-year work-
ers with part-time and part-year workers, but unlike the earlier figures, here
we combine the male and female samples. The year 1 and year 2 rates are
(unsurprisingly) very comparable in shape to our prior results seen in fig-
ure 2. The third line tracks the percentage of those who failed to respond
in both years. Although multiyear nonresponse is obviously lower than
annual nonresponse, we again find that such nonresponse is U-shaped
with respect to the level of earnings. Panel B presents the same breakdown
for the full-time, full-year sample, while panel C shows the full sample with
respect to hourly wage centiles. As in comparable panels in figure 2, we
find more pronounced U-shaped patterns in panels B and C.
Using IPW weights to account for individuals not linked to the DER,
columns 2 and 3 of table 5 present average earnings growth between the
first and second year of the panel. We focus primarily on column 3, ex-
amining the growth of inflation-adjusted earnings in the DER. Overall,
the average earnings growth was 0.013 log points. Most notable is the
striking pattern between those who respond only in one year: low (neg-
ative) DER earnings growth for those who respond only in year 1 and
high (positive) DER earnings growth for those who respond in year 2. This
TABLE 5
Joint Distribution of Response and Log Earnings Growth
by Response Status
Log Earnings Growth
Rate ASEC DER
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample .006 .013
Nonrespondent in both years 7.9 .037 .020
Respondent in both years 72.8 .0001 .011
Respondent only in year 1 10.3 2.008 2.017
Respondent only in year 2 9.0 .037 .055
Sources.—US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 An-
nual Social and Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration De-
tailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
Note.—This table shows nonresponse and response rates (col. 1) and log
earnings growth for ASEC earnings (col. 2) and DER earnings (col. 3) by re-
sponse status for the 2 year ASEC panel. Col. 1 is unweighted, while cols. 2
and 3 are weighted by inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage.
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pattern suggests strong selection into response based on changes in earn-
ings, and is consistent with the U-shaped pattern found in the cross-
sectional analysis as well; those who have very low or very high earnings
may fail to respond if that is an unusual or new situation. Earnings growth
for nonrespondents in either year is higher in absolute value than for those
who respond in both years. This provides further evidence that nonre-
sponse in the CPS should be treated as NMAR.
Here, unlike the previous analyses, the ASEC earnings growth includes
the imputations for nonrespondents. We include the ASEC growth rates
in column 2 for comparison and evaluation of the imputation process. Com-
parison of growth rates between the ASEC and DER confound both mea-
surement error and imputations in the two categories in which response
switches. For those who respond in both periods,measurement differences
lead to the ASEC having strikingly lower estimates of earnings growth.
In the case of nonresponse in both periods, the ASEC imputation proce-
dure appears to impute higher earnings growth than observed. While one
can take a variety of perspectives on whether administrative earnings are
the correct measure, the marked difference in relative growth suggests that
the imputations are extremely poor in capturing earnings dynamics.
FIG. 5.—Nonresponse rates by panel status for year 1 joint DER earnings distribution.
A, Earnings: all workers. B, Earnings: full-time, full-year workers. C, Average hourly earn-
ings: all workers. Each panel shows the nonresponse rate for a 3 point moving average
for the year 1 DER earnings distribution in the 2 year ASEC panel. The nonresponse rate
is shown for year 1, year 2, and both years of the panel. The nonresponse rate is weighted
using inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage. Sources: US Census Bureau Cur-
rent Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and Economic Supplement; Social Security
Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
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V. How Troubling Is Trouble in the Tails?
The Consequences of Nonresponse
The linked ASEC-DER data permit us to examine directly whether rely-
ing solely on respondents’ earnings may produce in some circumstances
results similar to what would be produced using complete (but unobtain-
able) data. Because the DER sample includes administrative earnings for
nonrespondents as well as respondents, we can compare estimates from
respondent-only samples with those from complete samples, something
not possible with publicly available data. Here we focus on three main types
of estimation that should provide researchers with guidelines for judging
the importance of nonresponse in their research (above and beyond that
demonstrated in the prior section on proxy responses and longitudinal
earnings growth). In Section V.A we examine the implications for linear
models of earnings fitted with least-squares estimators. We find a modest
impact from using a respondent-only sample, as the symmetric nonre-
sponse in the tails has little impact on estimation of the means. In Sec-
tion V.B, we consider the impact on coefficient estimates from quantile
regressions. Here we find estimates in the lower and upper quantiles from
respondent-only samples to be problematic, as compared to use of a full sam-
ple from the ASEC-DER link. Our concerns regarding use of a respondent-
only ASEC sample are reinforced in Section V.C, where we examine earn-
ings inequality. This conclusion is not surprising given that measures of
inequality are sensitive to earnings in the tails.
A. Mean Earnings Estimates
Using the ASEC-DER sample and the IPW weighting to account for rep-
resentativeness, we estimate least-squares log annual DER earnings equa-
tions by gender, separately for the linked respondents, linked nonrespon-
dents, and all linked workers samples, again controlling for the same set
of covariates used previously in the analysis. In table 6 we provide the pre-
dicted DER earnings for men and women using means from the full sam-
ple multiplied by coefficient estimates from (1) regressions using the full
sample in column 1, (2) regressions on the subsample of respondents in
column 2, and (3) regressions on the subsample of nonrespondents in
column 3. We use as our benchmark the predicted DER earnings based
on coefficients from the full sample in column 1.
Focusing first on men, the use of full-sample coefficients with the full-
sample worker attributes (X’s) results in a predicted mean log earnings of
10.488. This is close to that obtained using respondent-only b’s, which leads
to a predicted mean log earnings of 10.502, or 0.014 (1 percent) higher
than obtained with the full sample. The equivalent values for women are
10.053 using full sample b’s and 10.061 using respondent b’s, a 0.008 dif-
ference. However, selection on observables is readily evident comparing
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columns 2 and 3 using respondent (R) and nonrespondent (NR) b’s, re-
spectively. The R 2 NR predicted earnings difference is 10:502 2 10:437 5
0:065 formenand10:061 2 10:018 5 0:043 for women.Thesedifferences
are substantive. Because the nonrespondent shares of the total samples
are relatively small (roughly 20 percent), the respondent-only sample pro-
vides coefficient estimates close to what would be produced using the
full sample, the latter not being an option with public-use data. In short,
users of public data can avoid substantial bias by removing imputed earn-
ings. One can rebalance the respondent sample using inverse-probability
weights, adjusting the ASEC supplement weight with model-based estimates
of the probability of response. The analysis comparing male and female
earnings is particularly interesting because gender is the one worker attri-
bute alwaysmatched correctly in Census imputations (Bollinger andHirsch
2006). That is, there exists no “match bias” (i.e., wage gap attenuation) re-
sulting from assignment of imputed earnings from a different-sex donor.
B. Earnings Gaps across the Distribution
We next examine the implications of nonresponse across the distribution
of earnings for a host of widely studied outcomes such as earnings gaps
across gender, race, and education. Figures 6–8 depict estimates of coef-
ficients from quantile regressions of log annual earnings on the same set
of covariates used in our earlier conditional analyses at the 5th, 10th,
TABLE 6
Predicted Log DER Earnings with Full Sample, ASEC Respondents,
and ASEC Nonrespondents, 2006–11
Variable
b’s from ln EarningsDER
All Workers Respondents Nonrespondents
(1) (2) (3)
Men:
Prediction with full sample X ’s 10.488 10.502 10.437
Observations 224,852 180,564 44,288
R 2 of earnings equation .321 .327 .306
Women:
Prediction with full sample X ’s 10.053 10.061 10.018
Observations 214,869 175,253 39,616
R 2 of earnings equation .268 .274 .253
Sources.—US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
Note.—This table shows predicted mean ln EarningsDER from earnings regressions for
all linked workers (col. 1), linked respondents (col. 2), and linked nonrespondents (col. 3).
Predicted ln EarningsDER are based on sample means from the full ASEC sample. All columns
include additional controls described in table 2. Regression estimates use inverse-probability
weights for ASEC-DER linkage.
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25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th, and 99th quantiles. Each figure contains esti-
mates from two samples—one using DER earnings on both linked ASEC
respondents and nonrespondents (“All Linked”), and the other using linked
respondents only (“Linked Respondent”). We focus here on the full-time,
full-year subsample, in part because earnings distributions including part-
time and part-year workers confound the level of earnings with hours worked
and thus are difficult to interpret. While wages are often used in applica-
tions, concern arises there too with differences in wage distributions be-
tween full-time/full-year workers and those who work less, as well as poten-
tial measurement error in annual hours worked. It should be noted that
quantile estimates are measuring differences in the conditional distribu-
tion and hence do not match the unconditional quantiles.
Figure 6 presents the estimated coefficients on the female indicator
variable from pooled earnings quantile regressions, along with the p -value
of the difference in coefficient estimates from the two samples. The OLS
coefficients are presented as horizontal lines for comparison. In general,
FIG. 6.—Female-male earnings gap by quantile for full-time, full-year workers. This figure
plots the female coefficient from saturated quantile and OLS regressions using DER earn-
ings for two samples: (1) linked ASEC respondents and nonrespondents (“DER All Linked
Quantile” and “DER All Linked OLS”) and (2) linked respondents only (“DER Linked Respon-
dent Quantile” and “DER Linked Respondent OLS”). OLS and quantile estimates are weighted
using inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage. Numbers in the figure show p-values
of the difference in the quantile estimates between the “DER All Linked” and “DER Linked
Respondent” samples at each quantile. Sources: US Census Bureau Current Population
Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration
Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
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there are very few differences between the OLS estimates on the two sam-
ples; respondent-only samples produce mean estimates highly similar to
the typically unavailable full sample, thus avoiding the sometimes severe
bias from including imputations. Quantile estimates at the tails, however,
diverge substantially from mean estimates and from each other. We ob-
serve gender-gap estimates from the respondent-only sample that are bi-
ased in the tails. The understatement is 0.04 log points at the 5th percen-
tile, and 0.1 log points at the 99th percentile, or nearly one-fourth of the
overall gap. As noted in figure 2, differential response rates between men
and women are most pronounced in the tails of the distribution. These
differential rates in the tails have little impact on average gender gaps, but
gender-gap estimates in the tails are problematic.
In figure 7 we examine the black-white earnings differential separately
formen (panel A) and women (panel B) in the top panel, and theHispanic-
white differential for men (panel C) and women (panel D) in the bottom
panel. As in figure 6, we see a similar pattern, where the respondent sample
FIG. 7.—Earnings gaps by race, ethnicity, gender, and quantile for full-time, full-year work-
ers. A, Male black-white earnings gap. B, Female black-white earnings gap. C, Male Hispanic-
white earnings gap. D, Female Hispanic-white earnings gap. Panel A (C) plots the black
(Hispanic) coefficient from saturated quantile and OLS regressions using DER earnings
for twomale samples: (1) linked ASEC respondents and nonrespondents (“DERAll Linked
Quantile” and “DER All Linked OLS”) and (2) linked respondents only (“DER Linked Re-
spondent Quantile” and “DER Linked Respondent OLS”). Similarly, panel B (D) plots the
black (Hispanic) coefficient from saturated quantile andOLS regressions using DER earnings
for two female samples. OLS and quantile estimates are weighted using inverse-probability
weights for ASEC-DER linkage. Numbers in the figure show p-values of the difference in the
quantile estimates between the “DER All Linked” and “DER Linked Respondent” samples
at each quantile. Sources: US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual
Social and Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record,
2005–10.
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produces biased estimates that understate the racial gap among men. The
largest impact in panel A is at the high end of the distribution, where the
bias is 0.038 log points, or nearly 20 percent relative to the combined
respondent-nonrespondent sample. As with the male-female differential,
this is likely driven by missing high-earning men. Although black men are
less likely to report than white men in general, it appears that conditional
on other factors, nonrespondents are disproportionately white men at the
highest earnings. Here, along with the consistent underestimation of the
differential in the respondent-only sample, the OLS estimates display mod-
est underestimation as well. In panel B, the black-white differential for
women displays a slightly different pattern. While at the higher quantiles,
the respondent-only sample continues to slightly understate the gap, we
note that at the lower quantiles the bias is reversed, with the respondent-
only subsample slightly overstating the gap by about 0.012 log points,
or about 10 percent of the combined sample gap. Panels C and D depict
the respective gaps for men and women between Hispanics and whites.
As we saw for the female black-white differential, the respondent-only
sample understates the differential at the highest quantiles but overstates
it at the lower quantiles for both men and women. For Hispanic men,
the bias in the differential is most pronounced at the highest quantiles
(0.03 log points at the 99th percentile, or 20 percent of the combined
respondent/nonrespondent gap), while for women the bias is largest at
the lowest quantiles.
Finally, figure 8 examines the earnings differential between those whose
highest degree is high school (excluding GEDs) compared to high school
dropouts (panel A) and college graduates (with that being the highest de-
gree) compared to high school graduates (panel B). High school returns
are systematically understated using the respondent sample, particularly so
in the bottom half of the distribution, but with minimal difference at the
top of the distribution. The same qualitative pattern is seen for estimates
of the return to college, but with a modest downward bias throughout the
entire distribution (being largest at the 90th and 95th percentiles). In both
schooling return cases, the respondent sample understates the return at
the means (OLS).
C. Earnings Inequality
There is limited evidence regarding how earnings nonresponse affects
the measurement of inequality; a priori it is not readily apparent how it
should do so. One needs to identify who fails to respond, how nonresponse
differs with respect to true and typically unobserved earnings (conditional
on covariates), how any such nonresponse bias might differ across the earn-
ings distribution, and how one can best treat top-coded earnings. Census
uses different top-code values depending on earnings source, and these
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FIG. 8.—Earnings gaps by education and quantile: full-time, full-year workers. A, High
school return. B, College return. Panel A plots the coefficient comparing high school to
high school dropouts from saturated quantile and OLS regressions using DER earnings
for the two samples described in figure 6. Similarly, panel B plots the coefficient comparing
college graduates to high school graduates from saturated quantile and OLS regressions
using DER earnings for the two samples described in figure 6. OLS and quantile estimates
are weighted using inverse-probability weights for ASEC-DER linkage. Numbers in the fig-
ure show p-values of the difference in the quantile estimates between the “DER All Linked”
and “DER Linked Respondent” samples at each quantile. Sources: US Census Bureau Cur-
rent Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and Economic Supplement; Social Security
Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
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values differ between internal and public-release versions of the ASEC. A
key advantage of the DER data is that earnings are not top coded, thus
permitting a direct comparison of estimates of upper-tail inequality from
tax records to top-coded survey responses. Some inequality studies have
excluded imputed earners (Lemieux 2006; Autor et al. 2008), while others
have not (Burkhauser et al. 2012). This is the first such direct comparison
from linked individual survey and tax data on how nonresponse and top
coding affects earnings-inequality estimates. We estimate several leading
measures of inequality emphasized in the recent literature—including the
Gini coefficient (fig. 9) and 90-10 ratio (fig. 10), along with 90-50, 50-10,
and top 1 percent share in appendix figures 7–9. For brevity, we restrict
our discussion here to the Gini coefficient results as similar patterns are
obtained for the 90-10 ratio.
In panel A of figure 9 we show the earnings Gini for the full sample of
workers. Shown with the dash-dotted line is the full ASEC sample, with the
long-dashed line is the ASEC for respondents only, with the solid line is the
DER for all linked workers (and ASEC for nonlinked), and with the short-
dashed line is the DER for linked respondents. Comparing the full ASEC with
imputations versus ASEC respondents only, one sees that the respondent-
only sample shows too low a level of inequality owing to the omission of
nonrespondents disproportionately represented in the far left and right
tails.Hence, inclusion of imputations is appropriate for measuring uncon-
ditioned inequality, despite the severe biases that can arise from inclusion
of imputations in conditioned analyses (Bollinger and Hirsch 2006). As
with the ASEC, removing nonrespondents from the DER reduces the Gini
measure. The larger impact in the DER reflects the fact that the imputa-
tions in the ASEC do not capture the NMAR aspect of nonresponse. As
compared to the two DERmeasures, the ASEC measures show a substan-
tially lower level of inequality and somewhat different trends. Earnings in-
equality in the ASEC is roughly flat over the full sample period, and every-
where below the DER. Using DER earnings, we find a higher level of
inequality (about 10 percent higher) and a modest upward trend after
2007. Panel A establishes that NMAR nonresponse has an impact on
measures of inequality. Removing those missing values results in a down-
ward bias in estimating inequality. Although inclusion of the imputations
fails to account for NMAR bias, it does correct for MAR bias with respect
to those attributes matched in the Census imputations.
In panels B and C of figure 9, we explore whether the gap between
ASEC and DER earnings inequality is due to nonresponse (panel B) or
due to differences in measurement of earnings, including top coding
(panel C). Panel B shows three series—the ASEC inclusive of nonrespon-
dents, the DER for linked respondents and nonrespondents (and ASEC
for nonlinked), and a hybrid DER measure that uses DER earnings for
linked nonrespondents and ASEC earnings for respondents (and ASEC
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for the nonlinked). In all cases the sample size is held constant by using
the ASEC for the nonlinked, whether a respondent or nonrespondent.
Here we see that the hybrid measure produces a Gini level roughly one-
third to halfway between the pure ASEC and DER measures. Comparing
the hybrid measures to the pure ASEC measures supports the conclu-
sion that nonrandom, nonresponse bias (NMAR) causes an understate-
ment in the level and trend in earnings inequality based solely on ASEC.
Panel C presents the original ASEC and DER series, along with two
additional series. In one series the DER is used only for top-coded ASEC
values with a DER link, and in the other series we replace the ASEC with
theDER for workers in the top half but not bottomhalf of the ASEC earn-
ings distribution, regardless of imputation or top-code status. The former
case is of interest because the full ASEC and DER groups include a con-
volution of nonrespondents and top-coded workers, and thus it is less
obvious what direct role the top code in the internal ASEC plays vis-à-
vis administrative tax data. The latter case is of interest because the DER
does not capture off-the-book earnings, and thus the higher level of in-
equality observed in the DERmight be an artifact of underreported earn-
ings in the lower half of the distribution. The results in panel C demon-
strate that top-coded earnings alone in the internal ASEC are not the
primary cause of the gap in inequality estimates from tax data in the DER
versus ASEC survey data. The DER-only series shows substantially higher
and (to a lesser extent) rising inequality as compared to ASEC earnings with
DER replacing ASEC top codes. In addition, the majority of the gap be-
tween the DER and ASEC earnings inequality arises from earnings in the
upper half of the ASEC distribution, and not from off-the-books underre-
porting in the lower half. This conclusion is based on the minimal differ-
ences between the DER-only series and the hybrid ASEC-DER series with
DER earnings replacing the ASEC in the top half of the ASEC distribution.
ASEC measures of inequality tend to understate inequality because the
Census hot deck (owing to nonresponse bias) imputes earnings for nonre-
spondents that are too high in the left tail and too low in the right tail.
VI. Recommendations for Users of Public ASEC
Our results indicate that nonresponse bias causes both earnings gaps and
inequality measures estimated with ASEC earnings responses to be under-
stated. Because of nonresponse, the observed data include too few low
earners and too few very high earners. The Census hot-deck procedure,
based on the MAR assumption, fails to correct this problem because MAR
conditions are not met. The general CPS user community does not have
access to either the internal ASEC used in this paper or the DER. The
advantage of the former comes primarily from data with higher top-code
values compared to the public ASEC. Since 1996 Census has attempted
2176 journal of political economy
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to address this discrepancy, while still maintaining confidentiality, by re-
leasing “proxy values” for those individuals with earnings in between the
public and internal top codes. During survey years 1996–2010 the proxy
came in the form of cell means, while from 2011 onward via rank swap-
ping. The latter approach is preferred because it preserves the distribu-
tion of earnings above the top code. Recently Census released rank-swap
values for all the top-code income components (not just earnings) back to
1975, andwe recommend that public researchers using the ASECprior to
the 2011 survey year adopt these top codes.12
Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) and Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) rec-
ommended dropping the imputed nonrespondents in the ASEC because
of the attenuation bias that imputations impart on regression coefficients,
and then reweighting the sample with inverse-probability weights to re-
tain population representativeness. Their recommendation to drop im-
putations was based on analyses focusing on models of central tendency
(OLS, median regression). Overall, our results here strongly suggest that
MAR is violated across the distribution, and thus dropping nonrespon-
dents and reweighting will not correct for nonrandom nonresponse. In
practice, we demonstrate that the economic bias from nonresponse may
be small in well-specified linear models of wages and earnings. As a gen-
eral recommendation for distributional research, however, public ASEC
users are advised to implement a flexible selection model that corrects
for nonrandom nonresponse. In this section, we demonstrate the utility
of one such approach in an application to earnings inequality.
Specifically, we implement a procedure recently proposed in Arellano
and Bonhomme (2017) whereby one first estimates quantile regressions
corrected for nonresponse using copula methods, and then uses predic-
tions from those regressions to create simulated earnings data. The key
assumptions to identification are an exclusion restriction, continuity of the
residuals of the two equations (main and selection), continuity of the de-
pendent variable in the main outcome (earnings), and the propensity of
being observed being conditionally nonzero (e.g., there is not some group
that can be correctly predicted to never be observed). For our application,
we estimate conditional quantile models of earnings that include controls
for a quartic in age, nine education categories, race, gender, immigra-
tion status, region and metro status, and industry, and correct for non-
random selection using the Frank copula as it allows for nonresponse be-
ing concentrated in a tail.13 To identify the selection model, we use the
month-in-sample in which the respondent is observed in the ASEC as an
12 See https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/datasets/income-poverty
/time-series/data-extracts/asec-incometopcodes-swappingmethod-corrected-110514.zip.
13 Our programs, which are based on those provided by Arellano and Bonhomme (2017),
are available as supplementary material online at the journal’s website.
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exclusion restriction. All else being equal, we expect nonresponse to be
lower in month 1 or 5 of the rotation cycle as interviews are done in per-
son, while the other six months are conducted over the phone. Appen-
dix figure 3 seems to confirm this as it shows that rates of nonresponse in
months 1 and 5 lie everywhere below months 2–4 and 6–8. Thus month-
in-sample should be correlated with nonresponse, and at the same time,
we do not expect month-in-sample to be related to true individual earnings
(Bollinger andHirsch 2013).14 We have not observed any variable or com-
bination of variables that perfectly predicts nonresponse or response.
Thus, we are confident that the key assumptions for identifying the
Arellano and Bonhomme model are met.
After estimating the quantiles, we randomly generate an integer q be-
tween 1 and 99 for each individual in the full sample. Following the con-
ditional quantile decomposition method of Machado and Mata (2005),
we use the quantile coefficients associated with the draw of q for each in-
dividual to produce a prediction of the qth quantile of the earnings dis-
tribution. This provides a simulated distribution that can then be used to
estimate a variety of statistics, including measures of income inequality.
Because the nonresponse throughout the distribution is addressed differ-
entially at each quantile, the Arellano-Bonhomme approach will provide
a simulated distribution that has higher dispersion compared to the more
restrictive approach in Buchinsky (1998).
In evaluating the efficacy of this approach, there are two possible bench-
marks against which to compare our estimates, the latter of which is based
solely on survey responses from the ASEC. The first is the administrative
records of the DER. The DER provides a source of information on in-
come that is official and is a natural comparison. As noted in Section IV.C,
however, there are differences in how individuals report ASEC earnings
relative to their DER earnings. While one perspective is that the DER
earnings are “correct,” there is the potential that ASEC earnings contain
earnings that are not reported to the government (at the low end) or that
DER earnings contain other errors (see Kapteyn and Ypma 2007). The fun-
damental question being addressed in this paper is how to account for
nonresponse. Hence the ideal “benchmark” would be the ASEC in which
everyone answered the earnings question. The closest approximation to
that would be to use the ASEC earnings, but replace linked nonrespon-
dents with their DER. This is the benchmark we adopt.
We estimate the quantile selection model for each year, and in table 7
we present the 6 year average Gini coefficient, and 90-10, 90-50, and
14 Krueger, Mas, and Niu (2017) and Hirsch and Winters (2016) find substantial differ-
ences across the CPS month-in-sample reports of unemployment and multiple job hold-
ing, respectively. We find no such pattern of rotation group bias with respect to earnings.
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50-10 ratios. We present the estimates for the full ASEC including both
respondents and imputed nonrespondents, the ASEC for respondents
only but using inverse-probability weights to adjust for nonresponse, the
ASEC for respondents only using the copula selection model, and the
benchmark of ASEC for respondents and DER for nonrespondents.
Table 7 demonstrates that while the ASEC with IPWs brings the inequal-
ity estimates closer to the benchmark compared to the full ASEC, the
IPW approach falls short compared to the quantile copula selection model
that captures nonrandom selection into response in the tails. Figure 11
presents the annual estimates of the inequality measures, where we see
that for several measures (i.e., Gini and 90-50 ratio) our method some-
times exceeds inequality from the benchmark, and in some years falls
below, so that on average it aligns closely with the benchmark. The 90-
10 and 50-10 ratios using the copula method lie below the benchmark
in each year, suggesting that some of the measurement differences be-
tween the DER and ASEC at low earnings persist. The copula method still
performs better, relative to the benchmark, compared to either ASEC or
the ASEC with IPWs.
VII. Conclusion
This paper set out to examine the progress in earnings measurement in
the CPS in the more than three decades since the important critique of
Lillard et al. (1986). In our analysis we address three questions relying on
a unique restricted-access data set that links ASEC household files to ad-
ministrative earnings tax records. First, how do nonresponse and patterns
TABLE 7
Performance of Selection Correction Methods
for Nonresponse in the ASEC on Inequality
Inequality Measures
Sample Gini 90-10 90-50 50-10
ASEC .461 10.099 2.607 3.870
ASEC, only respondents with IPW .464 10.227 2.641 3.869
ASEC, only respondents with copula .482 10.521 2.676 3.929
ASEC for respondents, DER for
nonrespondents (benchmark) .477 11.038 2.683 4.112
Sources.—US Census Bureau Current Population Survey, 2006–11 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement; Social Security Administration Detailed Earnings Record, 2005–10.
Note.—This table shows inequality measures for the following series: the full ASEC sam-
ple, ASEC earnings only for respondents weighted by inverse-probability weights for non-
response, ASEC earnings only for respondents using the copula selection model, and DER
earnings for nonrespondents and ASEC earnings for respondents. See Sec. VI in the text
for further details about each series. Unless otherwise noted, all series are estimated using
the ASEC supplement weight.
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of nonresponse bias vary across the earnings distribution, and are these
patterns similar for women and men (and other groups)? Although levels
of nonresponse differ based on gender, race, and ethnicity, U-shaped pat-
terns of nonresponse across the earnings distribution are highly similar
across groups. Likewise, we see substantial differences in the level of non-
response based on the CPS survey month-in-sample and for proxy versus
self-respondents, yet we see highly similar U-shaped patterns of nonre-
sponse with respect to earnings for each of these groups. With or without
conditioning on covariates, we find a U-shaped nonresponse pattern, with
left-tail “strugglers” and right-tail “stars” being least likely to report earn-
ings. Women andmen have similar U-shaped nonresponse patterns across
the distribution, although men have a higher level of nonresponse.
Second, is nonresponse ignorable? The short answer is no. As stated
above, nonresponse is not independent of realized earnings, with or with-
out control for covariates. Relatedly, earnings differ with respect to re-
sponse status, conditional on covariates. Our third question asks whether
there are economic implications of nonrandomnonresponse on estimates
of earnings gaps and inequality. We do find small biases at the means for
some earnings gaps (e.g., schooling returns and racial/ethnic wage gaps).
Gender gaps are slightly understated throughoutmuchof the distribution,
but substantively understated in both the left and right tails. Because those
with unusually low and high earnings, conditional onmeasured attributes,
are disproportionatelymissing from the sample, wage equation coefficient
estimates on attributes associated with very low (high) earnings are under-
stated in absolute value. Race, gender, and returns to schooling gaps in the
tails can be off by as much as 20 percent due to nonresponse. Particularly
pronounced are estimates of upper-tail inequality, where nonresponse ac-
counts for one-third to one-half of the 30 percent gap between survey and
tax record estimates. Moreover, our evidence from matched panels shows
that earnings-growth estimates in the ASEC are substantially understated
from imputations. There is trouble in the tails.
The analysis in this paper has implications for researchers using the
CPS, as well as similar household data sets such as the American Commu-
nity Survey (ACS). As emphasized in prior work, even if nonresponse
were completely missing at random, severe “match bias” can arise in the
estimation of earnings-equation coefficients if researchers include non-
respondents whose earnings are imputed byCensus. The simplest andmost
widely used solution in this case is to throw out imputed earnings. The
respondent-only sample can be reweighted by the inverse probability of re-
sponse, although in practice this typically makes little difference. This easy
fix, however, does not provide consistent estimates when there is nonran-
dom nonresponse. This is particularly true for research focusing on the
upper and lower tails of the earnings distribution. Solving the problem of
trouble in the tails? 2181
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survey nonresponse is muchmore difficult absent access to linked admin-
istrative data. Progress on this front can continue with additional efforts
to link household surveys, tax records, and federal and state-level admin-
istrative data on transfers, as recommended recently by the bipartisan
Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking (2017). In the interim, we
demonstrated that a flexible copula-based model to correct for nonran-
dom selection into response offers promise for researchers conducting
distributional analysis using the ASEC.
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